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Building the Ship in Dry Dock: The case for Pre-
Independence Constitution-Building in Scotland 
ABSTRACT 
For newly independent states, constitution-building can be a defining moment: a time when national identities are 
asserted, values and norms articulated, and founding myths created. The constitution building process is a critical 
juncture between the divergent paths of stable and well- functioning democracy, on one hand, or persistent instability, 
coups, repression, and state failure, on the other. But what is the proper relationship of constitution-building to state 
formation? Should constitution-building occur before or after state formation? Or should the two processes somehow 
proceed in parallel? To address these questions in a Scottish context, this paper draws on state-formation and 
constitution-building processes in the Westminster-derived tradition. The paper considers the advantages and 
disadvantages of these sequences, and discusses the circumstances in which they might be applicable. It concludes by 
making some tentative recommendations for a pre-independence constitution building process in Scotland. 
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Major-General Lionel Dunsterville, commanding British forces in Baku at the time of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917, observed in his memoirs that, ‘It is extremely easy to break down an existing 
form of government, but to build up anything substantial in its place is a matter of considerable 
difficulty [….] and a long period of disorder must ensue during which the best efforts of the best 
men will not suffice to prevent ridiculous situations from arising.’ (Dunsterville, 2012). In states 
transitioning to independence, the challenge is not solely, or even primarily, to throw off the old 
order; usually, independence does not arise until that order is already willing to relinquish power 
or too weak to hold it. Rather, the challenge is to build a new order in its place – a constitutional 
order that will be enable the new state to govern itself with acceptable legitimacy, stability, inclusion 
and effectiveness. In the absence of such a constitutional order, situations may arise which are not 
merely ridiculous, but tragic.  
With the aim of avoiding ‘Dunsterville’s nightmare’, this article addresses the question of 
how to sequence constitution-building and independence. Focusing on Scotland, it is written in the 
midst of a continuing controversy surrounding the possibility of another Scottish independence 
referendum. If such a referendum were to be held, and if Scotland were in that event to vote for 
independence, the question of how to constitute the Scottish state, both in terms of substance and 
process, would have immediate practical importance. The prescriptive part of the paper is limited 
to Scotland; constitution-building depends on some many often unique contextual variables that 
generalizable conclusions about the ‘best process’ are unhelpful to the practitioner or policy-maker. 
Nevertheless, the overall argument of the paper (that pre-independence constitution building may 
be beneficial if circumstances, and particularly the attitude of the relinquishing power, permit) may 
be applied to other cases of transition to independence, especially if there is a desire to ensure that 
the new state is rooted in a civic, constitutional nationalism and maintains polyarchic governance.  
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The existing literature on constitutional processes primarily focuses on how and by whom 
constitutions are made, whether process matters, and the relative importance of elite pacts and 
public participation (e.g. Hardin, 1989; Ordeshook, 1992; Elster, 1995; Negretto 2013; Saati 2015; 
Wheatley & Mendes, 2016; Elkins et al, 2009). The question of when constitution-making should 
take place has largely been ignored. Bell and Zulueta-Fülscher (2016) address this in post-conflict 
situations, but not in countries transitioning to independence. In independence transitions, it is a 
classic ‘chicken and egg’ problem: a state cannot safely exist without a constitution, which is key to 
establishing its institutions and its identity, but how can a constitution be made for a state that does 
not yet exist?  
 Jon Elster et al (1996: 27) famously likened constitution-building to ‘rebuilding a ship at sea’. 
The adoption of a new constitution entails reconstructing the ship of state from the keel up, from 
its basic legal-institutional foundations. At the same time, it must keep on sailing. It must continue, 
during the constitution-building process, to function as a viable state: to maintain the rule of law 
and public security, to collect and expend revenues, and to provide public services. This poses a 
difficult challenge, not least because the period of constitution-building is likely to be characterised 
by ‘mega-constitutional politics’ (Russell, 1993), during which constitutional change overshadows 
the rest of political life. It absorbs the energy, passion and political resources of political leaders, 
while day-to-day issues (education, health, justice, infrastructure, fiscal issues etc) are pushed to the 
bottom of the political agenda. 
Occasionally, peaceful, stable democracies will undertake major constitutional change in 
non-crisis situations, without violence or institutional rupture: as in Canada before 1982 (Russell, 
1993) and Belgium before the adoption of the 1994 constitution (Fitzmaurice, 1996; Covell, 1985; 
Popelier & Lemmens, 2015). However, constitution-building rarely occurs in such calm waters. It 
normally happens in response to momentous political shifts, such as regime collapse, a revolution, 
severe economic troubles, defeat in war, the negotiated end of a civil war, or – most relevant for 
present purposes – on becoming independent (Elster, 1995). Mega-constitutional politics therefore 
often takes place not against the backdrop of having to continue with routine ‘governance as usual’, 
but alongside a host of other challenging institution-building or institution-reforming activities. In 
the transition to independence, for example, it might be necessary not only to adopt a constitution, 
but also to establish armed forces, diplomatic and consular services, a new currency, and so forth.  
In the transition to independence, these difficulties are multiplied. Newly independent states 
have a long to-do list, spanning everything from tasks like issuing passports, adopting a currency, 
and opening embassies, to more general objectives like achieving broad public legitimacy. For some 
countries, meeting all those challenges at once could be overwhelming. States facing multiple 
demands beyond their capacity to deliver are in danger either of becoming a state or falling into 
authoritarianism. Certainly, independence does not always lead to democracy, peace and prosperity.  
This article, drawing on the experience of British decolonisation, argues that there is a strong 
case for pre-independence constitution-building in Scotland. This enables constitution-building 
and the transition to independence to be disentangled – so that the activities become sequential 
rather than concurrent. It could be likened to ‘building a ship in drydock’. There are two main 
advantages to pre-independence constitution-building. The first is that there is no dangerous 
‘Dunstervillian gap’, during which the constitutional order of the old system has been sundered, 
but the new one has not come into effect. There is scope for an almost seamless constitutional 
transition. The second is that the new state, because its constitution has been agreed and adopted 
in advance, does not have to go through the choppy waters of ‘mega-constitutional politics’ while 
still navigating through the tricky (economic, institutional, diplomatic) narrows of independence. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The first sets the discussion in a 
Scottish context, outlining the constitutional policy of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Section 
Two discusses the functions of a written constitution, particularly (although not exclusively) in a 
newly independent state, and the requirements (from a normative but realistic perspective) of a 
constitution-building process. The third section examines pre-independence constitution-building 
processes: how they are structured, their strengths and weaknesses, and the contexts in which they 
are appropriate. The fourth section looks at the alternative – a post-independence constitution-
building process – and likewise considers its pros and cons. The paper concludes by returning to 
the Scottish problem and considering how pre-independence constitution-building, despite its 
limitations, may be advantageous in any future re-run of the independence referendum. 
The paper draws primarily on Commonwealth examples from the decolonisation era. Clearly 
Scotland is not in any traditional sense a colony, and Scotland today is very different, in terms of 
size, economic development, and democratic experience, from India and Pakistan in the 1940s or 
the Commonwealth Caribbean in the 1960s. Nevertheless, this is not as strange a choice at it might 
seem. These Commonwealth countries share the common factor, relevant for the purposes of this 
article, of having become independent from the United Kingdom. Assuming that the United 
Kingdom would respect the result of any future independence referendum and if necessary support 
a peaceful and orderly transition, there are clear potential similarities between Scotland and those 
decolonisation cases; this applies both to the design of the constitution-building process and to the 
continuingly relevant legacies of the ‘Westminster Model’ as a normative basis for a viable and 
acceptable constitution (Patapan, Wanna and Weller, 2005). 
For the purposes of this article, a written constitution is defined as a ‘supreme and fundamental 
law’. It is supreme in the sense that it is harder to amend than ordinary law and prevails over 
ordinary law in case of incompatibility. It is fundamental in that it deals with fundamental rights, 
principles, and institutional structures. Such a constitution is found in the majority of the world’s 
democracies, including in the rest of Europe and most of the Commonwealth. Constitution-building 
is the complex process of developing, drafting, adopting and implementing a written constitution. 
Constitution-making is the crucial phase of the constitution-building process during which arguing 
and bargaining takes place (within the bounds defined by the overall process design). The 
constitution-making body is the institution, mandated as part of the constitution building process, to perform 
the task of constitution-making; it may be a Constituent Assembly, a Constitutional Commission, a 
Constitutional Conference, parliamentary constitutional review committee, or some other body.  
Finally, this paper does not argue for or against Scottish independence. My own views on 
that subject have never been hidden and need not be repeated here. Neither does the paper argue 
explicitly for or against a written constitution. There may be reasonable theoretical and practical 
arguments, in an old democracy, for relying instead on parliamentary sovereignty and conventions, 
tempered by the self-restraint of the politicians. I remain unconvinced by those arguments, but that 
is not the subject of this paper. In practical terms, if Scotland decides to become independent, it 
will not be faced with the question of whether to write a constitution, but how – and crucially when.  
I. Scottish Constitutional Proposals  
 
The SNP, the main pro-independence party in Scotland, has long publicly committed itself to the 
principle of a written constitution for an independent Scotland (Bulmer, 2011; 2016). The party 
adopted a draft constitution for Scotland in 1977, and reissued this, with minor changes, over the 
years. The fullest constitutional policy statements were published when the party was still in 
opposition: A Free Scotland (SNP, 2002) and Citizens, not Subjects (SNP, 2005). These constitutional 
proposals contained some features that by British standards would be novel (Bulmer, 2011), but 
little thought seems to have been given as to how the constitutional transition would be sequenced.  
The assumption implicit in these policy papers is that the draft constitution would be 
published ahead of the independence referendum and linked to the outcome of the vote, such that 
in voting for independence the people would also be endorsing the proposed constitution. There 
would have been no real constitution-building process, just a mechanism for constitutional adoption. 
Of course, getting the necessary enabling legislation through the Scottish Parliament might have 
provided opportunities for the draft constitution to be debated, challenged and perhaps amended 
before being finalised, while the need to win a referendum would have acted as a ‘downstream 
constraint’, in Elster’s (1995) terms, encouraging the Scottish Government to be sensitive to what 
public opinion would accept. Even so, it would be democracy only in a minimal, majoritarian way.  
In government (minority 2007-2011; majority 2011-2016; minority 2016-), the SNP recoiled 
from this approach. In private conversation, several Ministers and members of the Scottish 
Parliament voiced concern that the independence vote could be a hostage to specific constitutional 
provisions; they wanted to maximise the broadest possible support for independence by keeping 
divisive constitutional issues off the agenda until after independence. 
In summer 2014, the Scottish Government published a draft Interim Constitution (Scottish 
Government, 2014-A). This short, minimal document was intended to act as a basic ‘constitutional 
platform’, which, together with the existing Scotland Act and other institutional statutes, would 
provide the legal and institutional basis for the foundation of an independent Scotland (Bulmer, 
2016; Scottish Government, 2014-B). As a transitional text, it was not entrenched against unilateral 
amendment by ordinary legislative majorities and lacked the institutional detail expected of even 
the most basic constitution. Instead, it contained provisions (section 33) for the development of a 
written constitution for Scotland by means of a ‘Constitutional Convention’, to be organised by an 
Act of the post-independence Parliament of Scotland.  
In the event, independence was rejected in the referendum held on 19 September 2014. It is 
doubtful whether the content of the draft Interim Constitution swung many votes either way. But 
clearly the SNP and the wider ‘Yes’ movement failed to reassure a majority of the Scottish voters 
that independence was a ‘safe bet’. The SNP failed to understand, and so to present, independence 
as a state-building project with constitutional democracy at its core. The White Paper elided the 
choice of a new constitutional order with the policy preferences of the SNP in the first Parliament 
of an independent Scotland (Scottish Government, 2014-B), thereby fusing state and party in a way 
that has elsewhere has been corrosive of constitutional democracy. If an independent Scotland is 
to be a flourishing polyarchy rather an a competitive (or even non-competitive) authoritarian state, 
and if it is to be rooted in a civic-democratic rather than ethnic sense of nationalism, then these 
constitutional issues cannot be overlooked. There is a need for a deeper understanding not only of 
the content of a future constitution, but also of the process by which the constitution is developed.  
II. Constitutions and Constitution-Building in Transitions to Independence 
 
Written constitutions in democracies perform various functions (Ghai, 2010:3). Many of these are 
relevant to all countries, including long-established states. There are certain functions, however, 
that are especially important during the transition to independence. These can be considered under 
seven headings: Authority, Signalling, Inclusion, Institution-Building, Reassurance, Certainty and 
Recognition.1 
The first function of a written constitution is to establish the state’s claim to authority. The 
constitution generates legitimate, stable, inclusive and effective authority by providing legal-
institutional basis for the depersonalisation of power; it instantiates and generalises power, 
separating the authority of the government-of-the-day, or of any particular party or person, from 
the authority of the state-as-such (Thornhill, 2011).  
Achieving such authority requires a state to set out and to justify the nature of the regime, 
the basic values which will motivate and legitimate it, and the broad goals it will seek to pursue. 
This is ‘signalling’. Constitutions perform this function with varying degrees of both detail and 
explicitness. Some leave such things to be inferred from the substantive and structural provisions 
of the text (e.g Canada, The Netherlands); others provide an ideological or historical justification 
for the state as in the 2011 Constitution of Hungary, with its ‘national avowal’ (Toth, 2013). In any 
case, the constitution of a country transitioning to independence can serve as a ‘prospectus’ for the 
new state: it lets its citizens know what kind of state they are to be part of. While this function may 
be performed by other quasi-constitutional documents, such as the Declaration of Independence 
in Israel (Navot, 2014), only the constitution can give legal effect to such a prospectus, translating 
political promises into a form that both binds and bounds the state’s claim to legitimate power.  
Ensuring inclusion in the new political order is another of the functions to be emphasized 
by constitutions in states transitioning to independence. At present, the question of independence 
divides the Scottish population into nationalist and unionist camps. If independence happens, this 
division will lose its salience. All Scottish citizens will then have an interest in stable and legitimate 
democratic institutions, freedom of political debate and opposition, free and fair elections, the 
protection of fundamental rights, and in the honest and competent administration of public affairs. 
Those basic foundations should unite, not divide. The constitution of a newly-independent state, 
therefore, should be an inclusive instrument that protects, recognises and empowers all its citizens.  
Inclusion may require the constitution to embody and enshrine strategic ‘deals’ done in the 
process of state-creation – deals without which legitimate stable authority cannot be sustained. 
Often this takes the form of sharing power between the centre and periphery, or between founding 
peoples. It might involve protecting the identity and autonomy of particular minority communities 
whose inclusion is a prerequisite for the successful achievement of independence in the first place. 
In a Scottish context, the decision to keep the monarchy after independence could be seen as an 
attempt to include Unionists and to reconcile them, through the Crown, to a new Scottish state.  
Constitutions create and regulate institutions. Some countries, like Scotland, already have a 
set of working institutions, exercising real if limited powers of self-government: there is a Scottish 
Parliament, Government and judiciary, as well as institutions like the Public Services Ombudsman, 
the Auditor-General, and the raw material for a Scottish civil service. In these contexts, the role of 
a written constitution is not so much to create these institutions as to defend and preserve them, 
by defining the limits of ordinary legislative power in relation to them. The constitutional 
 
1 For an earlier and less well developed list, from which this is derived, see Bulmer, 2018.  
amendment rule, which prevents the Government, backed by an ordinary majority, from easily or 
unilaterally changing the fundamental institutional structure, is a key constitutional design choice.  
This brings us to reassurance. Transition to independence is a fraught moment in a nation’s 
history. Supporters of Scottish independence, especially on the left, have tended to emphasise the 
transformative, aspirational potential of a written constitution. The Scottish Government’s 2014 
draft Interim Constitution, for example, contained provisions on environmental rights and a ban 
on nuclear weapons (Scottish Government, 2014-A). The constitution can contain such 
‘covenantal’ provisions (Bulmer, 2015), but these are perhaps secondary benefits. Primordially, a 
constitution must be a defensive document, which provides legal certainty and continuity, 
prevents governments from abusing power by undermining rights or manipulating the rules. Before 
a constitution marks out a path towards a better society, it must first provide guarantees that things 
will not get worse.  
Finally, the constitution of a state transitioning to independence is an instrument for the 
achievement of international recognition. An old, long-established state might be able to muddle 
through without adopting a written Constitution, but it would be much harder for a new state to 
be taken seriously in the international arena without a written constitution. Moreover, there is an 
emerging framework of regional and international supra-constitutional law to which states must 
adhere if they are to claim democratic legitimately in the eyes of the world (Law & Versteeg, 2012). 
The constitution is a way of showing, to an international audience, that a newly independent 
Scotland is sincere about its commitments to democracy. This is especially important in the eyes 
of institutional gatekeepers such as the Venice Commission, which sees itself as the guardian of 
‘European values’ (democracy, human rights and the rule of law); without a written constitution, 
Scotland would not meet today’s EU accession criteria, or even gain EU Associated State status.  
The primary advantage of having the constitution agreed before independence, and ready to 
come into effect on independence day, is that it avoids any gap between the old order and the new, 
during which the state could be very vulnerable. In this gap, many newly independent countries 
have fallen into authoritarianism, or even civil war and state failure, because they have not achieved 
an initial consensus on the constitutional basis of the political system. One might compare, for 
example, Argentina and Brazil in the mid-19th century (Gargarella, 2010), post-independence 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Butt & Lindsey, 2012; Harding, 2012), Zimbabwe and Botswana in the 
1980s (Darnolf, 1997), and Bulgaria and Ukraine since the 1990s (Smilov, 2013; Choudhry, Sedelius 
and Kyrychenko, 2018; Wolczuk, 2001) as pairs of counties in which the presence or absence of 
consensus on the constitutional order led to different trajectories of institutional consolidation or 
disintegration.  
This is not an excuse for rushing. There is a need both for technical quality (coherence, clarity 
and completeness) and legitimacy. To ensure quality, most constitution-building processes include 
‘experts’, such as constitutional advisors, legal drafters and academics. To ensure legitimacy, the 
constitution must be rooted in both elite consensus and popular approval, although there is an on-
going debate on how the constitution-building process should be structured, and particularly on 
the benefits, effects and limitations of elite pacts, on the one hand, and public participation, on the 
other (see: Elkins et al, 2009; Saati, 2015; Wheatley & Mendez, 2016). 
Constitution-building is therefore a co-operative activity involving ‘experts’ (technical 
support and advice), ‘elites’ (doing the hard bargaining) and ‘everyone’ (the general public, whose 
approval is necessary for legitimacy). A constitution-building process should engage these different 
groups and to apply their contributions at the appropriate points. For example, the public might 
typically come in at the beginning of a process in setting broad objectives (through the election of 
the constitution-making body), and in approving the final constitution (such as by means of a 
referendum). Political elites might be engaged in the institution-forging arguing and bargaining 
stage – the crunch point of the process where deals are done (Negretto, 2013) – and also in the 
implementation stage. The experts might dip in and out to advise and inform at various stages.  
Additionally, ‘externals’ may be relevant actors. As discussed above, that Scottish 
constitution would have to comply with liberal-democratic norms if it is to win approval in Europe, 
and the Venice Commission could act as a powerful ‘downstream constraint’. The strategic, military 
or economic interests of powerful neighbours may also constrain constitutional choices. Scotland 
might have to abide by agreements with Westminster reached during the process of independence, 
which have to be written into the constitution; there are precedents for this in the way the Anglo-
Irish Treaty was integrated into the Irish Free State constitution.  
The sequencing of constitution-building and independence might have important practical 
consequences for the design of the process as a whole. The choice of when to write the constitution 
– before or after independence – can open some doors, in terms of the form that the constitution-
making body takes, its inclusivity, its openness, or the upstream and downstream constraints by 
which the constitution-making body may be bound. It is no coincidence, as will be explored in the 
next two sections, that pre-independence constitution-building in the Commonwealth has often 
relied on a Constitutional Conferences, consisting of elites and experts, while post-independence 
constitution-building processes have tended to rely on elected Constituent Assemblies. 
 
III. Pre-Independence Constitution-Building in the Commonwealth 
 
Pre-independence constitution building became a standard pattern for British decolonisation in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It was widely adopted in Africa, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. The 
details varied with each case, but the process would typically begin with pro-independence parties 
winning a majority of seats in the colony’s legislature. The Chief Minister, or other responsible 
leader of the legislative majority, would then formally apply to the British for independence. A 
Constitutional Conference would be convened – normally at Lancaster House in London - to 
which the leadership of the main political parties (Government and Opposition) would be invited. 
In some cases, representatives of major interest groups, such as the chiefs in Botswana 
(Mokopakgosi, 2008) or white settlers in Kenya (Report of the Kenya Independence Conference, 
1963), would also participate – although direct public engagement, of the sort seen in today’s 
constitution-building processes, was minimal to non-existent.  
The Constitutional Conference would produce a report, outlining a draft ‘independence 
constitution’ and setting the date for independence. An Independence Act would then be passed 
by the United Kingdom Parliament, with the text of the new constitution, as agreed by the 
Conference, issued as an Order-in-Council under the terms of the Act.  On the appointed day, the 
military band would play ‘God Save the Queen’, the Union Flag would come down, the 
‘constitutional instruments’ would be handed over, and the new national flag would go up to the 
sound of the new anthem. There would – in principle – be no gaps between the old order and the 
new, no period of legal uncertainty, no fraught period of mega-constitutional politics.  
The choice of a Constitutional Conference as the main constitution-making body is a natural 
– although not inevitable – consequence of a pre-independence constitution-building processes. In 
such cases, there is presumably a legislature already in existence to manage those functions over 
which the jurisdiction, although non-sovereign, has self-governing powers. That legislature is likely 
to possess a relatively high degree of democratic legitimacy; equally, it will contain the main political 
leadership, who will not wish to be challenged or overshadowed by another elected, parallel body 
claiming constituent power.  
The presence of the British officials in these constitution-making processes disqualified the 
pre-independence constitutions from being the work of a sovereign national constituent power. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that these were simply imposed constitutions. Colonial 
Office officials hosted these Conferences, chaired them, and supported them with legal advice and 
secretariat functions. Sometimes they intervened to protect what they perceived to be British 
strategic or economic interests, and sometimes to ensure fair play and to lead the parties towards a 
more balanced constitutional settlement.  In many cases, for example, the British actively supported 
the adoption by newly independent countries of bills of rights (Parkinson, 2008). Yet genuine 
negotiations took place between the national political parties and the constitutions often did reflect 
public opinion, or at least the consensus of national elite opinion.  
Such national participation goes some way to addressing issues of democratic legitimacy 
arising from pre-independence constitution-building. Andrew Arato (2016: 93-97) notes that the 
legislature of an outgoing regime (in these decolonisation cases, the British Parliament) may be a 
legitimate constitutional actor when it is simply giving legal effect to political agreements that are 
perceived as legitimate by being arrived at through a round-table negotiation; the Constitutional 
Conference provides the necessary political legitimacy, while the Westminster Parliament simply 
provides the necessary legal authority.  
Moreover, the national politicians at Constitutional Conferences did not have an entirely free 
hand. Often they were constrained by domestic public opinion, either through up-stream elections 
held before the Constitutional Conference to give a mandate, or through down-stream elections in 
which the parties would have to justify their actions to the people. In some cases (e.g. Malta) a 
referendum was also held on the final constitutional settlement. As Martin Henry (2017) argues in 
relation to the constitution of Jamaica, it was not ‘pre-fabricated’ nor merely ‘handed to’ Jamaica 
by the British colonial authorities, but ‘made by Jamaicans for Jamaicans’.  
The greatest advantage of pre-independence constitution making in post-colonial contexts is 
that it addresses the need for reassurance and certainty. The terms of independence and the forms 
of government under which the independent state would operate, as well as the rights of its citizens 
and any special guarantees to minorities, are known before independence day. Indeed, the initial 
decision to become independent cannot come into effect until constitutional terms are agreed. 
These pre-independence constitution-building processes also helped to address the issues of 
authority and institution-building. In many cases (not all) the Crown was retained at independence. 
Whatever may be the arguments for or against monarchy in the abstract, keeping an established 
locus of authority may have helped some newly independent states to avoid the dissolution and 
disintegration which might occur in the absence of such authority. Similarly, Acts of the British 
Parliament or Orders-in-Council could provide for continuity of government during the transition. 
Pre-independence constitution-building is not always a viable option. It presumes, above all, 
the goodwill of the colonial or other overseeing power. The UK has a long history of granting 
independence to countries. In some cases, the UK actively resisted independence, through various 
combinations of military force, selective repression and political influence, until it was finally forced 
to reach an agreement. In others – such as some Caribbean and South Pacific nations in the late 
twentieth century – the UK actively supported moves towards independence. In general, however, 
the UK Government accepted incremental extensions of self-rule, and once independence became 
inevitable sought to manage rather than resist the transition. If that goodwill is not present, or if 
the metropolitan power has lost legitimacy, to the point of not being trusted as a negotiating 
partner, there is little scope for constitution-building to take place while it is still in overall charge; 
only a post-independent process, operating in conditions of sovereignty, is likely to be accepted. 
Secondly, pre-independence constitution-building is difficult when the question of whether 
to become independent is still unsettled. In such circumstances it can be difficult to achieve the 
necessary inter-elite consensus and public agreement on the constitution of a new state. Those who 
oppose independence have an incentive to make independence seem as risky and uncertain as 
possible, and they are likely to boycott the process, or act as spoilers, rather than constructively 
engaging in the process. Only once independence is an inevitability can Unionists begin to think in 
terms of how (not whether) an independent state should be established; only then are they likely 
to get involved in substantive constitutional negotiations. This does not necessarily rule out pre-
independence constitution-building, but it does make it less inclusive if it occurs before that tipping 
point is reached.  
Thirdly, there is the issue of timing. The danger of post-independence constitution-building 
is that it might take a long time – as in Pakistan – for a constitution to be produced, or even result 
in the whole constitutional project being shelved – as in Israel (Lerner, 2011; Navot, 2014). The 
danger in pre-independence constitution-building is that it will be too hasty. Delays in the process 
of agreeing the constitution may delay independence. This can provide a powerful collective 
impetus to reach agreement – especially where there is already a consensus around the desirability 
of independence and discussion only of its terms. However, it can also result in excessive pressure 
to rush the process and to reach only superficial agreements – this can result in vague or incomplete 
constitutions, which correlate with short expected constitutional endurance (Elkins et al, 2009). 
There is also likely to be less time for public engagement in the process – a deficiency for which a 
confirmatory referendum at the end of the process is no substitute (Wheatley & Mendes, 2016). 
Finally, the choice of pre-independence constitution-building has implications for the sort 
of constitution that can be produced. Because of the pressures inducing the choice of a relatively 
small, elite and expert-driven Constitutional Conference, the potential involvement of ‘imperial’ 
authorities, the compressed timescale with independence as its end goal, and limited opportunities 
for direct public engagement, constitutions emerging from pre-independence constitution-building 
processes are likely to be more conservative (small-c) in nature.  Radical constitutional innovation 
may be stifled. Whether this is a good or bad thing depends on the context and one’s point of view, 
of course, but for those who see constitution-building as an opportunity for radical change, pre-
independence processes may seem unduly limiting.  
 
IV. Post-Independence Constitution-Building in the Commonwealth 
 
In the Commonwealth, India and Pakistan are the most important examples of post-independence 
constitution-building. The Indian National Congress had committed itself to a post-independence 
Constituent Assembly as early as 1935. This was accepted by the British in the ‘August Offer’ of 
1940, reiterated by Sir Stafford Cripps in 1942, and given concrete form in the Cabinet Mission 
Plan of 1946 (Singh, 1990).  The work of constitution-building in India began in 1946, before 
independence, but the failure of the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress (‘Congress 
party’) to reach agreement resulted in both India and Pakistan becoming independent in 1947, 
before either country had completed its constitution. The Indian Independence Act 1947 conferred 
legislative powers on the Constituent Assemblies of India and Pakistan, which became sovereign 
constituent bodies in Arato’s (2016) sense that they were not constrained by any higher law.  
Post-independence constitution-building had the advantage of establishing a legitimate, 
national sovereign authority without interference from the former imperial power. From the point 
of view of a national liberation movement like the Congress party, this offered the ability to devise 
a truly sovereign constitution, rather than to receive a constitution pre-formed for them or imposed 
on them by the British. The Indian Constitution was agreed by Indians amongst themselves – not 
negotiated between Indians and the Colonial Office. The British could not wield a veto power over 
the constitution by threatening to postpone independence, because independence had already been 
granted. However, the basic constitutional forms and fundamental constitutional ideas were still 
indirectly influenced by the former colonial power, both in terms of historical path dependency, 
and through the more subtle but pervasive mechanisms of influence amongst elites, such as 
socialization and education (Austin, 2000; Galligan and Versteeg, 2012).  
A post-independence process encourages the use of a Constituent Assembly as its primary 
constitution-building body. Having declared independence on terms that are still open and 
unresolved, the establishment of an elected Constituent Assembly provides a basis for inclusion 
and democratic legitimacy. There needs to be a parliament in the new country – and that parliament, 
once it has been elected and seated, might as well do double-duty as both interim legislature and 
Constituent Assembly in which all the high drama of mega-constitutional politics played out.  
Constituent Assemblies can play an important signalling role, declaring and forging national 
identity. Being a sovereign and inclusive body, the Constituent Assembly of India (despite its 
indirect election by provincial legislatures) could seize the opportunity for a fresh start, for a 
transformative ‘constitutional moment’ in which higher law-making, as Bruce Ackerman (1991) 
would describe it, could take place. The Constituent Assembly could be an authentic expression of 
national identity and pride. In the words of Jawajarlal Nehru, it represented: 
'a nation on the move, throwing away the shell of its past political and possibly, social 
structure, and fashioning for itself a new garment of its own making. It means the 
masses of a country in action through their elected representatives. It has thus a 
definite revolutionary significance.’ (Nehru, 1988: 17).  
India’s Constituent Assembly has captured a place in the national political imagination. It 
shows how a post-independence process can enable national founding to be expressed through a 
distinct constitutional moment, which becomes part of a nation’s political mythology and historical 
legacy. Certainly, the Indian Constituent Assembly has a bigger role in the national story and in the 
legitimation of constitution than, say the independence conference in a country like Jamaica.  
There is, on the other hand, no guarantee that things will proceed so smoothly. Pakistan’s 
delayed and interrupted constitutional process provides a warning counterpoint to the Indian 
experience. It took nearly a decade after independence – until 1956 – for Pakistan to give itself a 
constitution, and in the decades which followed it proved difficult to maintain a consensus at both 
elite and mass levels around any constitutional settlement, or even, considering the independence 
of Bangladesh, to maintain agreement about the boundaries or identity of the state itself (Waseem, 
2015). Pakistan’s experience highlights the biggest risk of post-independence constitution-building 
– that a country, having becoming independent without first building a workable consensus around 
a given constitutional order, may suffer from a crisis of authority – ‘Dunsterville’s nightmare’ - be 
plunged into an abyss of civil war, military coups and cyclical dictatorships. From such a torn fabric, 
it is very hard to rebuild legal, democratic institutions.  
Judged against the criteria of certainty and reassurance, the process in both India and Pakistan 
was wanting. Because the Constituent Assemblies were legally sovereign there was no guarantee, 
at the moment of independence, of what sort of constitution would result. In India, under the 
leadership of Nehru and the Congress Party, aided by individuals such as B. N. Rao and B. R. 
Ambedkar, this had few if any ill effects. In Pakistan, however, the constitution that emerged 
differed greatly in tone and substance from that which the leaders of the Pakistan independence 
movement had promised beforehand: Muhammad Ali Jinnah had promised a secular constitution 
for a Muslim-majority people, but the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly 
in 1949 set out a vision of an Islamic republic at odds with that promise (Hirschl, 2010). A 
politician’s promise, before independence, is no guarantee of a subsequent constitutional outcome.  
 
V. Conclusions and Application to Scotland 
 
It would be premature and misguided to conclude that a pre-independence approach is necessarily 
the best course of action in all circumstances. As has been argued, much depends on the attitude 
of the relinquishing power, and whether it will facilitate or obstruct a constitutional path to 
independence. Nevertheless, one can make a tentative presumption in favour of pre-independence 
constitution-building if circumstances permit. If a country becomes independent without a 
reasonably sound and robust constitution in place, it would be dangerously exposed to the risks of 
authoritarian backsliding, corruption and incumbent manipulation. The government in office on 
day one of independence would have, at that point, every incentive and opportunity to bend the 
rules of the game to its own advantage – manipulating electoral laws, or eroding associative liberties, 
or restricting media freedoms – in ways that result in the sort of ethno-nationalist and competitive 
(or non-competitive) authoritarian state that the opponents of independence fear.  
This is not only a problem for Scotland, but neither is it a problem from which Scotland is 
exempt. It is a near-universal risk to which newly formed states are exposed. In this respect the 
normality of Scotland – the fact that Scotland, like other newly independent states, would have no 
guarantee of democratic success in absence of a broadly agreed constitutional order - is emphasised. 
If there is any heightened risk, it comes from Scotland’s oil and gas resources; authoritarian 
populism, state capture by rent-seeking oligarchs, foreign intervention, and the chronic under-
development of non-extractive economic sectors are some of the risks to which resource-rich states 
are especially vulnerable (Frankel, 2012).  
The constitution cannot be a panacea. Neither is it the only determinant of democratic 
success; there are economic, social and cultural, as well as institutional, explanations for democracy 
(Huntington, 1993; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Nevertheless, placing 
the legal foundations of institutions in a constitution is almost everywhere regarded as a normal 
and necessary basis for a stable, legitimate democratic state. Having a constitution ready to go on 
independence day, rather than scrabbling about in the years immediately following independence 
when so many other economic and policy issues have to be addressed, would help avoid 
‘Dunsterville’s nightmare’. It would go a long way towards ensuring that an independent Scotland 
would be a both a ‘civic’ state (in which all enjoy equal rights-based citizenship, regardless of race, 
religion or origins) and a ‘polyarchic’ state (where public power is exercised through inclusive and 
contestatory democratic processes). If Scottish independence were merely an ethnic project, 
perhaps this would be of secondary importance, but to an independence movement that is 
predicated on a civic and democratic form of nationalism, the constitution is primordial.  
A decolonisation-era ‘Constitutional Conference’ might not map perfectly onto current (or 
foreseeable) Scottish conditions, not least because of the potentially unhelpful attitude of the UK 
Government and the spoiler role of Unionist parties. Under the current Conservative Government 
at Westminster, constructive engagement is doubtful; this might change if, for instance, a future 
Labour Government were to be dependent on SNP votes in the House of Commons. Even in the 
absence of support from the UK Government, an attempt could be made to develop a draft 
constitution which at least represents a consensus amongst those who are open to independence.  
A Constitutional Conference might replicate the partial, but sufficient, consensus achieved 
around devolution by the Constitutional Convention in the 1990s. One might imagine a body, 
organised on the basis of an Act of the Scottish Parliament, containing any political parties willing 
to participate alongside the pillars of Scottish civil society – churches, trade unions, professional 
associations, local authorities etc. Contentious issues arising from the Constitutional Convention 
might even be referred to a Citizens’ Assembly, showing that pre-independence constitution need 
not exclude public participation. The draft, once approved by the Constitutional Convention and 
the Citizens’ Assembly, could then be adopted as a schedule to any future Independence Act. 
A constitution adopted in this way need not involve major institutional innovation; it could 
mainly be an exercise in codifying and entrenching – and thereby protecting from unilateral change 
– the institutions and rights that currently exist in Scotland by statute, with such alterations as may 
be necessary for an independent state. The resulting constitution might look quite similar to British-
derived ‘Westminster Export Model’ constitutions (de Smith, 1961), although incorporating those 
reforms already adopted in Scotland under devolution (such as proportional representation, fixed 
term Parliaments, and the formal election of the First Minister by a vote of the Parliament).  
The usual limitation of pre-independence constitution-building is that it results in a moderate 
constitution, transferring rather than transforming power. In Scotland, the opposite danger arises: 
insufficient inter-elite inclusion may produce an excessively radical text. Without the presence of 
conservative Unionist voices, the resulting constitution might be more of a wish-list or manifesto 
than a broad agreement on the legal-institutional basis of the state. Such one-sided constitutions 
may be short-lived (Elkins et al, 2009). Just as it is vital to lay solid foundations, it is folly to pander 
to one’s own supporters while building castles in the sky. To guard against this, the constitution-
making body’s statutory terms of reference should be clearly defined, and there should be a strong 
secretariat to act as a source not only of expert advice, but also of caution and moderation. More 
radical demands might be met by a commitment, hard-wired into the text of the constitution, to 
future review, once the dust of independence has settled and the institutions of the new state have 
had time to bed-in. This would resemble a staggered, multi-stage, ‘post-sovereign’ process (Arato, 
2016). In that way, openness to inclusion and innovation in the post-independence phase would 
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